

Congressional Party Defection in American History

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Abstract

In this paper, we analyze the roll call voting behavior of those House and Senate members who changed their party affiliation during the course of their political career. We analyze members who switched during the stable periods of the three major two-party systems in American history: the Federalist-Jeffersonian Republican system (3rd to 12th Congresses), the Democratic-Whig System (20th to 30th Congresses), and the Democratic-Republican System (46th to 106th Congresses). Our primary finding is that the biggest changes in the roll call voting behavior of party defectors is observed during periods of high ideological polarization, and that party defections of the past 30 years are distinct from switches in other eras due both to high polarization and the disappearance of a second dimension of ideological conflict.

1. Introduction

The swift emergence of partisan factions in the early days of the republic is somewhat ironic given the Founders' distaste for the partisan factions they believed would lead to divisive politics (Hofstadter, 1969). While both the nature of partisan politics and the parties themselves have changed over time, most scholars of American legislative politics take the existence of parties as given. Paraphrasing Schattschneider (1942), the operation of congressional politics in America is unthinkable save in terms of parties. The perpetual nature of partisan conflict in American politics has led to a somewhat static view of party affiliation, and for good reason: the vast majority of members of Congress maintain a single party affiliation throughout their tenure in office. While nearly all MCs retain a single party label for the entirety of their congressional careers, party affiliation can be variable. Congressional scholars have recognized that fact and investigated both the reasons for switching parties as well as the behavioral consequences of party defection on roll call behavior by members of Congress. Though small, the group of party defectors allows for a direct assessment of the influence of political parties on individual-level congressional behavior.

While party defection is extremely rare, scholars have taken an increasing interest in its causes and consequences. Aldrich and Bianco (1992) show formally that MCs may have strong electoral incentives to switch parties. The implication of the theory is that by switching parties while in office, incumbent legislators can deter strong challengers from entering either primary or general elections. In other words, switching parties can be a rational strategy for election-oriented MCs. Changing parties is not a costless endeavor, however, as evident by the fact that nearly all MCs maintain a single party label

throughout their careers. Grose and Yoshinika (n.d.) find that, contrary to the conclusions of Aldrich and Bianco (1992), members incur significant electoral costs when changing parties. On average, the MCs who switch parties face stiffer competition and lower vote shares in both primary and general elections following their defection.

Others have analyzed party switching in an effort to identify the factors that cause individuals to change party affiliation. King and Benjamin (1986) study party defections over a wide swath of American history (1789-1984). They find that party switching is most likely to coincide with important political events such as changes in partisan control of political institutions, with changes in key economic indicators, and in times of military conflict. In recent Congresses, it is the ideologically cross-pressured members who are most likely to change parties (Castle and Fett, 1996). In spatial terms, some Democrats (Republicans) might find themselves closer to the median member of the Republican (Democratic) Party, hence such cross-pressured members may find a party switch appealing for ideological reasons. During the past 30 years, the Republican Party sought to facilitate the party defection of a number of conservative Southern Democrats at both the national and sub-national level with an active recruitment process to join the GOP (Canon, 1992).

These previous works help shed light on why members might have an incentive to change parties, but they do not speak to the behavioral consequences of party defection. It is possible that members simply continue to compile a consistent roll call voting record within the confines of their new party; that is, a change in party label produces no behavioral change. When one does compare the pre- and post-switch roll call behavior of party defectors, one finds significant changes in roll call voting behavior at the point in

time the member crosses the aisle (Nokken, 2000; McCarty, Poole, and Rosenthal, 2001; Oppenheimer, 2000). Membership in a new party carries with it a different set of expectations of an appropriate voting record. A legislator cannot compile an extremely liberal roll call voting record and credibly call herself a Republican. Party affiliation constrains roll call behavior. Once a member changes parties, the set of constraints upon their roll call behavior also change. Some legislators may “switch with a vengeance” in order to show their new colleagues in the new party that they are “real” Republicans or “true” Democrats (see, especially, Cox and McCubbins, 1993, chapter 5; Kiewiet and McCubbins, 1991, chapter 3).

Findings of significant partisan effects resulting from party defection come primarily from post-WWII congresses and essentially for individuals leaving one major party to join the other major party. We extend Oppenheimer’s (2000) analysis of switchers from the Democratic-Republican Party system preceding WWII. We analyze and compare the roll call behavior of party switchers both within and across the stable periods of the three major two-party systems in American history: the Federalist – Jeffersonian Republican system, Democrat - Whig system, and Democrat – Republican system.

To measure change in behavior we use a modified form of DW-NOMINATE scores (McCarty, Poole, and Rosenthal, 1997; Poole and Rosenthal, 2001) that allows us to compare, for any pair of Congresses, members who switch parties with those who do not switch. We analyze the behavioral consequences of party defections across the three two-party systems to learn how important differences in the political environment may have exerted different influences on the behavior of party switchers. The overall patterns

of roll call voting differ substantially across the three two-party systems (Poole and Rosenthal, 1997). During the Whig-Democrat system slavery divided both political parties internally. Consequently, a member could switch parties and not change his behavior on slavery roll calls. More recently, roll call voting has been marked by an increase in polarization between the two political parties with roll call voting almost entirely along liberal/conservative lines (King, 1998; Poole and Rosenthal, 1984; 1997; 2001). Consequently, one would expect that more recent switchers would exhibit substantial changes to their roll call voting behavior. Thus we might expect a bigger behavioral change from recent party switchers than those in the Whig-Democrat era but, *relative* to their peers, it is possible that switchers in previous eras substantially changed their voting behavior. These are the issues we address below.

The paper proceeds as follows. In the next section, we describe our rationale for limiting our analyses to the aforementioned party systems, and describe how we identified and defined party defections. In Section Three, we explain the scaling procedure used to generate ideal point estimates used to compare switchers within and across party systems. Section Four details our findings, and Section Five concludes.

2. Identifying Party Switchers

We limit our analysis to the stable periods of the three two-party systems. For the Federalist – Jeffersonian Republican era we use the 3rd to the 12th Congresses (1793 through the spring of 1813). By the 3rd Congress the voting blocs associated with Hamilton and Jefferson had solidified in the House and Senate (Martis, 1989, pp. 27-28, and the literature cited therein) so we begin our analysis with the 3rd Congress. We end

our analysis with the 12th Congress – the last to be elected before the onset of the War of 1812. The opposition of many of the Federalists to the War of 1812 resulted in the disintegration of the Federalist Party followed by what was essentially a one party system during the Era of Good Feelings. For the Whig – Democrat system we use the 20th to the 30th Congresses (1827 through the spring of 1849). The 20th Congress was the first Congress elected after the divisive 1824 presidential election split the Jeffersonian Republican party into factions primarily identified with Andrew Jackson and John Quincy Adams. We end with the 30th Congress (elected 1846) because the 31st Congress (elected 1848) wrote the disastrous Compromise of 1850 that caused the Whig party to disintegrate. For the Republican – Democrat system we begin with the 46th Congress because it was the first Congress elected after the Compromise of 1877 that ended Reconstruction (Woodward, 1951).

Our first task in assessing the effect of party switches on voting behavior involved identifying those individuals who changed their party affiliation at some time during their congressional careers. To ensure we do not bias our results in favor of finding significant effects, our definition of party switchers was purposely broad. In other words, we erred on the side of inclusion. Generally, any member who served in Congress under more than one party label, whether the switch occurred during a MC's term in office or between separate terms of service, was included as a party switcher.¹ That definition, however, created certain problems when trying to classify party switches from a number of early congresses.

In order to compile a complete list of party defectors, we utilized multiple procedures and sources. Party defections in the modern, post WWII era, are documented

in works by Nokken (2000), McCarty, Poole, and Rosenthal (2001) and Grose and Yoshinika (2001). Oppenheimer (2000) provides an extensive list of party switchers dating back to the late 19th Century. In addition to these sources, we used the party labels in Martis (1989) to identify all House and Senate members who served under more than one party label. While the individuals on the list did, indeed, serve under more than one party label, not every change in affiliation can be categorized as a party switch.

Identifying party switches during the Federalist – Jeffersonian Republican and Democrat - Whig party systems is somewhat tricky due to both the fluidity of party labels and multiple changes in individuals' party codes. For example, at the outset of both the Federalist – Jeffersonian Republican and Democrat - Whig party systems, MCs' party affiliations were often determined by their support for a specific presidential candidate. After generating this large list of possible party defectors, we went through the list and removed those individuals whose party labels changed, but whose party affiliation remained essentially the same.² Every other instance of a party defection is assumed to be a meaningful change in affiliation.

Included in our list of switchers are members who leave one of the major parties to affiliate with minor parties. Some prominent examples of such switches include South Carolinians who leave the Democratic Party in the Jacksonian era to become Nullifiers; other opponents of Jackson who were members of the Anti-Mason Party before being classified as a Whig or Anti-Jackson. Another large bloc of party switching occurred during the Progressive era when a number of individuals switched to/from the Progressive party or the various agrarian and labor movement parties such as the Farmer Labor Party in Minnesota. Members whose party labels changed to/from Republican to

Silver or Silver Republican; as well as members from Virginia from the late 1800s who switched from Readjuster to Republican are included. Finally, members who left a party to serve as independents are also coded as party switchers.³

In the end, we identify 38 instances of party switches in the Senate (1 from the Federalist – Jeffersonian Republican era, 12 from the Whig-Democrat Era, and 25 from the Democrat-Republican era) and 160 in the House (3 from the Federalist-Republican era, 76 from the Whig-Democrat era, and 81 from the Democrat-Republican Era), listed in Tables 1 and 2, respectively.⁴

Tables 1 and 2 About Here

Analyses of the post-WWII party defectors uncovered significant changes in roll call behavior directly attributable to those members' shift in party affiliation (Nokken, 2000). While we expect party switching to carry with it some behavioral consequences, we do not expect every instance of party defection to generate identical patterns of change. The nature and magnitude of the defectors' behavioral changes depends heavily upon the prevailing partisan divisions within congress at the time of the switch. In other words, some partisan divisions foster significant changes, others do not. The key factor that determines whether or not members make significant changes to their roll call records when they switch is party polarization. During times of high polarization, we would expect MCs to exhibit dramatic changes in their voting behavior, and less dramatic changes during less polarized periods. Why is this the case? During periods of high polarization, we see little if any overlap of the parties, while in less polarized periods we

often see significant overlap. When a member changes parties during a period of high polarization, he must make dramatic adjustments to his voting behavior in order to credibly commit to membership in a new camp. With ideological overlap of parties during periods of lesser polarization, a defector need not make a dramatic shift to fit in with his new colleagues. A defector might even maintain a consistent voting record in such cases because there would be other members of the new party who exhibit similar behavior.

Figures 1 and 2 About Here

Figures 1 and 2 show the average distance between and within the two major parties during the three major two-party systems using two-dimensional DW-NOMINATE scores. Following Poole and Rosenthal (1997), our measure of party polarization is the between party distance. This is the average distance between all pairs of members of the two opposing parties. To measure the dispersion of the parties – the within party distance – we compute the average distance between all pairs of members of the same party. The switchers in the Democrat-Republican system are concentrated between the 47th and 54th Congresses (8 switchers) at the height of the conflict over bimetallism and industrial capitalism, and the period from the 92nd Congress onwards (13 switchers) when party polarization began to rapidly increase.

Parties play an extremely important role in structuring roll call voting strategies during times of increased polarization. When a member switches parties during a period of high polarization, a significant alteration of his or her roll call voting record would be

required in order to achieve any sort of fit within the new party. The significant shift in behavior could stem from either (or both) of two sources. First, the party leadership within the institution may enhance the magnitude of a switcher's change in voting behavior. Party leaders control a number of important resources members' desire. Desirable committee assignments, for instance, are more likely to go to those MCs who exhibit party loyalty on important roll call votes (Rohde, 1991; Cox and McCubbins, 1993), especially during the highly polarized, strong Speaker era of the late 19th Century (Jones, 1968; Polsby, Gallaher, and Rundquist, 1969; Lawrence, Maltzman, and Wahlbeck, 2001). In an effort to acquire important institutional resources controlled by the party leadership, party defectors have strong incentives to become loyal members of their new party.

Electoral concerns also explain why party defectors exhibit significant shifts in their roll call behavior during the modern period of high polarization. In order to remain in office, the party switchers must navigate safely through potentially dangerous waters, namely the primary constituency of their new party. It is not obvious that the once former foes of a party switcher will let bygones be bygones and welcome that member into the party. The immediate electoral danger for the switcher is his new party's primary. In order to reduce the likelihood of strong challengers in the primary, the defector has a strong incentive to start to compile a voting record that closely resembles the ideological preferences of the primary voters in the new party. Should members switch parties and not alter voting behavior in any meaningful way, a strong primary challenge from an individual who does mirror the party's preference would be nearly certain.

Additionally, we expect behavioral changes to take a specific form. Specifically, members modify their roll call voting behavior by becoming more liberal or more conservative, depending upon which party they ultimately join. More generally, behavioral change should take place along the primary dimension of American political conflict, a traditional liberal-conservative dimension. For much of the nation's history, this liberal-conservative dimension has served to structure political conflict. With specific reference to the measure incorporated in this analysis, the 1st dimension of DW-NOMINATE. We do not expect significant behavioral changes to be observed on the second NOMINATE dimension, because that dimension captures regional variation for the congresses we analyzed.

Extrapolating from the polarization prediction, we also expect significant behavioral changes to be concentrated among those members who left one of the two major parties to join the other. Switches between the two major parties almost certainly involve disputes over issues that fall along the primary dimension of ideological conflict. That said, our set of party defectors includes numerous instances of movement between major and minor parties. Those defections, we contend, would be much more likely to result from regional issues. The implication, then, is that we do not expect to observe significant changes in those members' spatial location along the first dimension.

Finally, we expect the party defections that took place over the past 30 years to be qualitatively different from those of earlier eras. Notably, we expect to observe recent party switchers to exhibit larger changes in their voting behavior for two reasons. First, this time frame is characterized by increasing ideological polarization (Poole and Rosenthal, 1984; 1987; McCarty, Poole, and Rosenthal, 1997). Second, following the

divisive battles over civil rights in the 1960s, the explanatory power of the second NOMINATE dimension has declined noticeably since that time. The combination of increased ideological polarization and the evaporation of second dimension conflict suggest that party defectors have no choice but to shift significantly along the first dimension. Because there is no overlap between the two parties, switchers cannot take refuge among the moderate wing of the other party because that moderate wing no longer exists. Likewise, with the disappearance of the second dimension, the parties have become more ideologically homogenous, so the region-specific factors that once drove party defection are no longer present.

3. Measuring the Effect of Party Switching

To measure the effect of a change in political party on a legislator's voting record, we use a modified version of DW-NOMINATE scores (McCarty, Poole, and Rosenthal, 1997; Poole and Rosenthal, 2001) computed for Houses/Senates 1 to 106. To create a baseline, we first estimated the DW-NOMINATE two-dimensional *constant* coordinate model, that is, every legislator has the same ideal point throughout his or her career in the two dimensional space. Then, holding the roll call outcomes from the two dimensional constant model fixed, we estimated an ideal point for every legislator in every Congress. This allows us to compare the changes in ideal points of party switchers versus members who did not switch parties between any pair of Congresses.

The policy outcomes corresponding to “Yea” and “Nay” for the j th roll call on the k th dimension for Congress t are $z_{jk_{yt}}$ and $z_{jk_{nt}}$ respectively. The i th legislator's coordinate on the k th dimension is x_{ik} . (In the constant model there is no time index for

the legislators.) If q is the total number of roll calls, p the number of unique legislators, and s is the number of dimensions, then $2qs + ps + s - 1 + 1$ parameters are estimated in the DW-NOMINATE constant model. The “ $s-1$ ” are the dimension weights for dimensions 2 through s (the “W” in DW-NOMINATE stands for “weighted” – the model utilizes a weighted Euclidean metric) and the “1” is the variance of the error.

Let \mathbf{x}_{ikt} be the i th legislator’s coordinate on the k th dimension in Congress t estimated from the roll call outcomes -- \mathbf{z}_{jkyt} and \mathbf{z}_{jknt} -- for Congress t from DW-NOMINATE (note that we now have a t index on the legislators -- \mathbf{x}_{ikt} should not be confused with the \mathbf{x}_{ik} above). To estimate the \mathbf{x}_{ikt} we use a standard random utility framework with a normal distribution deterministic utility function and normally distributed random error.

Specifically, the squared distance of legislator i to the “Yea” outcome of roll call j on the k th dimension at time t is:

$$\mathbf{d}_{ijkt}^2 = (\mathbf{x}_{ikt} - \mathbf{z}_{jkty})^2$$

Legislator i ’s utility for the “Yea” outcome on roll call j at time t is:

$$U_{ijty} = \mathbf{u}_{ijty} + \boldsymbol{\varepsilon}_{ijty} = \boldsymbol{\beta} \exp \left[- \sum_{k=1}^s \mathbf{w}_k^2 \mathbf{d}_{ijkt}^2 \right] + \boldsymbol{\varepsilon}_{ijty} \quad (1)$$

where \mathbf{u}_{ijty} is the deterministic portion of the utility function, $\boldsymbol{\varepsilon}_{ijty}$ is the stochastic portion and \mathbf{w}_k are the dimension weights from DW-NOMINATE. (Note that $\mathbf{w}_1 = 1$.) The parameter $\boldsymbol{\beta}$ “adjusts” for the overall noise level and is proportional to $1/\sigma^2$ where σ is the standard deviation of the $\boldsymbol{\varepsilon}$; that is:

$$\boldsymbol{\varepsilon} \sim N(\mathbf{0}, \sigma^2)$$

Hence, the probability that legislator i votes for the “Yea” outcome can be written in terms of the distribution function of the normal; that is,

$$\begin{aligned} P_{ijty} = P(U_{ijty} > U_{ijtn}) = P(\varepsilon_{ijtn} - \varepsilon_{ijty} < u_{ijty} - u_{ijtn}) = \\ \Phi\left\{\beta\left(\exp\left[-\sum_{k=1}^s w_k^2 d_{ijkty}^2\right] - \exp\left[-\sum_{k=1}^s w_k^2 d_{ijktn}^2\right]\right)\right\} \end{aligned} \quad (2)$$

The only unknown in equation (2) is the legislator’s ideal point – the x_{ikt} . It is a simple matter to estimate these from the likelihood function formed from equation (2) by standard methods.

To measure the effect of a change in political party we compute the distance between the legislator’s ideal point in the last Congress of his old party and the first Congress of his new party and compare this distance to the distances computed for all legislators in the corresponding pair of Congresses. The distance for the i th legislator is:

$$d_{ion} = \sqrt{\sum_{k=1}^s w_k^2 (x_{iko} - x_{ikn})^2}$$

where “o” indicates the last Congress of the old party and “n” indicates the first Congress of the new party.

In Tables 1 and 2 the column on the right marked “N” shows the number of legislators that served in the pair of Congresses for the corresponding party switcher. For example, in Table 1 the only party switcher in the Jeffersonian-Republican/Federalist period was Foster (RI) who switched from Federalist to Jeffersonian-Republican between the 6th and 7th Senates. Foster was one of 17 Senators who served in both the 6th and 7th Senate. The column marked “PCT” shows what percentage of the legislators serving in the pair of Congresses had d_{ion} values *less than* the party switcher. For Foster, 71 percent

or 12 of the 17 Senators had smaller distances than Foster while 4 had larger distances than Foster.

The last column of Tables 1 and 2 indicates the *direction* of the shift of the party switcher. If a member switched from one major party to the other major party and his/her ideal point moved closer to the mean of the new party, then we placed a “+” in this column. If a major party switcher moved away from the mean of the new party, we placed a “-“ in this column. A “0” indicates a non-major party switch.

Finally, our last indicator of change is a comparison of the magnitude of the change of the switcher *on the first dimension only* (\mathbf{d}_{ion} computed on the first dimension) with the corresponding standard errors of the first dimension ideal points. Because the first dimension divides the two major parties in each of the three major party periods, major party switchers will tend to move mostly along the first dimension. When a members’ name appears in bold font in Tables 1 and 2, it indicates that \mathbf{d}_{ion} computed along the first dimension is greater than the sum of the standard errors for the corresponding two ideal points⁵.

Most party switchers change either between Congresses or near the beginning of a Congress. However, there are a few legislators who switch during a Congress. For those legislators, we determined when the switch took place and used the roll calls prior to the change to estimate \mathbf{x}_{iko} and the roll calls after the switch to estimate \mathbf{x}_{ikn} . We computed \mathbf{d}_{ion} from these two ideal points and then compared it to all members who served in the current and next Congresses. Because fewer roll calls are used to estimate the ideal points of the within Congress switchers, this will tend to inflate \mathbf{d}_{ion} somewhat for those

legislators. However, in every case there were at least 70 roll calls to estimate the ideal point.

To check our methodology we computed measures of fit for DW-NOMINATE, our model (fixed cutting lines with legislators estimated for each Congress), and NOMINATE applied to each Congress separately (cutting lines and legislators estimated for each Congress). If our model accounts for most of the increase in fit from DW-NOMINATE to scaling each Congress separately, then this means that our assumption of fixed cutting lines is reasonable.

For the House, the two-dimensional DW-NOMINATE scaling correctly classified 86.1 percent of member votes with an aggregate proportional reduction in error (APRE) of 0.580 and a geometric mean probability of 0.733. The figures for our model were 86.7 percent, an APRE of 0.595, and a gmp of 0.742, respectively. For each Congress separately the figures are 86.8 percent, an APRE of 0.601, and a gmp of 0.743. For the Senate, the two-dimensional DW-NOMINATE scaling correctly classified 84.8 percent of member votes with an APRE of 0.550 and a gmp of 0.719. For our model, the correct classification is 85.8 percent, an APRE of 0.579, and a gmp of 0.731. For each Congress separately the figures are 85.9 percent, an APRE of 0.581, and a gmp of 0.733. In sum, our model fits almost as well as estimating each Congress separately. This means that we are capturing most of the change of fit from DW-NOMINATE to the separate Congress scalings with our model. That is, most of the difference in fit is due to shifting ideal points *not* to shifting cutting lines.

4. Discussion

Our three indicators of shift show that significant party shifts are relatively rare. The total number of party switchers is 38 for the Senate and 160 in the House. We define a “significant” shift as one where the switcher’s movement is greater than at least 95 percent of the members in common between a pair of Congresses. In addition, if the switch is from one major party to another, we require that the switcher’s movement be *towards* the new party – namely a “+” in the final column of Tables 1 and 2. By this criteria only 6 of the 38 switchers in the Senate were significant. One of these 6 is suspect because of the long time period between the two Congresses. Berrien (GA) was a Jackson supporter in the 20th Senate and returned as a Whig in the 27th Senate. Only four Senators served in both Senates. Berrien’s change was the largest of the four and in the correct direction.

Four of the remaining 5 significant Senate switchers occurred after World War II with Wayne Morse (OR) accounting for two of them. In sum, there are too few cases in the Senate to establish an historical pattern.

In the House, 35 of the 160 party switchers were significant – 8 in the Democrat-Whig party system and 27 in the Democrat-Republican party system. Four of the 8 switchers during the Democrat-Whig system switched between the 23rd and 24th Houses and all 4 were from Tennessee – Bell, Bunch, Forester, and Standifer.⁶ The remaining 4 switchers were scattered with no clear pattern. The 27 significant switchers in the Democrat-Republican party system are concentrated during the periods of high polarization⁷ in the system; namely, during the later 19th and early 20th Centuries and

during the past 30 years. Indeed, every switch in the House and Senate since 1983 has been significant (whether shifts of Forbes and Goode in the House are significant cannot be determined until after the 107th Congress).

5. Conclusion

In this paper, we analyzed the roll call voting behavior of individuals who switched party affiliation within three important party eras in American history. Over a period of 79 congresses (158 years), we observe very few instances of party defection. Although party defection is rare, the 198 instances of party switching during these periods allow us to make some important conclusions about the role party plays in structuring roll call behavior. Most notably, the effects of party switching are not constant over time. Party defections in periods of relatively low ideological polarization tend not to result in significant shifts in a member's ideological position within the chamber. Likewise changes to and from major parties to minor parties and independent status tend not to result in major position shifts by the party defector. Significant changes in roll call behavior among switchers are concentrated among those who leave one major party to join the other in periods of high ideological polarization.

Though far from providing a definite conclusion to the work on party defection, we contend this paper offers a set of important findings that serves both to inform scholars about the varying salience of party labels across time, as well as offering important insight into another consequence of increased ideological polarization.

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Table 1. Senate Party Switchers

Jeffersonian-Republican vs. Federalist

OLD PARTY		NEW PARTY				Name	N	PCT	
Last Yr	Last Cong	Old Party	1st Year	1st Cong	New Party				
1799	6	Federalist	1801	7	Republican	FOSTER, T	17	71	+

Democrat vs. Whig

OLD PARTY		NEW PARTY				Name	N	PCT	
Last Yr	Last Cong	Old Party	1st Year	1st Cong	New Party				
1827	20	Jackson	1841	27	Whig	BERRIEN, J	4	100	+
1829	21	Jackson	1831	22	Nullifier	HAYNE, R	34	85	0
1829	21	Jackson	1831	22	Anti-Jackson	POINDEXTER,	34	94*	+
1831	22	Jackson	1833	23	Anti-Jackson	BLACK, J	35	23	-
1831	22	Jackson	1833	23	Anti-Jackson	MANGUM, W	35	91*	+
1831	22	Jackson	1833	23	Anti-Jackson	MOORE, G	35	71	+
1831	22	Jackson	1833	23	Anti-Jackson	TYLER, J	35	57	+
1833	23	Jackson	1835	24	Anti-Jackson	WHITE, H	39	82	+
1835	24	Nullifier	1837	25	Democrat	CALHOUN, J	44	93*	0
1835	24	Nullifier	1837	25	Whig	PRESTON, W	44	71	0
1837	25	Democrat	1839	26	Whig	RIVES, W	43	91	+
1837	25	Democrat	1839	26	Whig	TALLMADGE	43	5	+

Democrat vs. Republican

OLD PARTY		NEW PARTY				Name	N	PCT	
Last Yr	Last Cong	Old Party	1st Year	1st Cong	New Party				
1883	48	Readjuster	1885	49	Republican	MAHONE, W	61	2	0
1883	48	Readjuster	1885	49	Republican	RIDDLEBERGE	61	61	0
1891	52	Republican	1893	53	Silver	STEWART, W	74	92	0
1893	53	Republican	1895	54	Silver	JONES, J	72	90	0
1895	54	Republican	1897	55	Silver Republic	CANNON, F	68	63	0
1895	54	Republican	1901	57	Democrat	DUBOIS, F	38	92	+
1895	54	Republican	1897	55	Silver Republic	MANTLE, L	68	2	0
1895	54	Republican	1897	55	Silver Republic	PETTIGREW	68	95*	0
1895	54	Republican	1897	55	Silver Republic	TELLER, H	68	12	0
1899	56	Populist	1901	57	Democrat	HEITFELD, H	69	70	0
1899	56	Silver	1901	57	Republican	JONES, J	69	75	0
1899	56	Silver	1901	57	Republican	STEWART, W	69	77	0
1899	56	Silver Republic	1901	57	Democrat	TELLER, H	69	22	0
1899	56	Silver Republic	1901	57	Democrat	TURNER, G	69	4	0
1911	62	Republican	1913	63	Progressive	POINDEXTER	76	88	0
1913	63	Progressive	1915	64	Republican	POINDEXTER	85	59	0
1933	73	Republican	1935	74	Progressive	LA FOLLETTE	83	13	0
1935	74	Republican	1937	75	Independent	NORRIS, G	79	1	0
1939	76	Farmer-Labor	1941	77	Republican	SHIPSTEAD, H	80	91	0
1951	82	Republican	1953	83	Independent	MORSE, W	79	100*	0

1955	84	Independent	1957	85	Democrat	MORSE, W	86	98	0
1963	88	Democrat	1965	89	Republican	THURMOND, J	91	77	-
1969	91	Democrat	1971	92	Independent	BYRD, H	90	92	0
1993	103	Democrat	1995	104	Republican	SHELBY, R	89	100*	+
1995	104	Democrat	1995	104	Republican	CAMPBELL, B	86	100*	+

+ Major Party to Major Party Shift, Behavioral Change in Proper Direction

- Major Party to Major Party Shift, Behavioral Change in Wrong Direction

0 Switch to/from Minor Party

Table 2. House Party Switchers

Jeffersonian-Republican vs. Federalist

OLD PARTY		NEW PARTY						
Last Yr	Last Cong	Old Party	1st Yr	1st Cong	New Party	Name	N	Pct
1795	4	Federalist	1797	5	Republican	FREEMAN, N	61	8 +
1795	4	Federalist	1799	6	Republican	KITCHELL, A	34	50 +
1797	5	Federalist	1801	7	Republican	TILLINGHAST	35	54 -

Democratic vs. Whig

OLD PARTY		NEW PARTY						
Last Yr	Last Cong	Old Party	1st Yr	1st Cong	New Party	Name	N	Pct
1827	20	Jackson	1829	21	Anti-Jackson	CROCKETT, D	112	65 +
1827	20	Adams Democrat	1829	21	Anti Masonic	TRACY, P	112	68 0
1827	20	Adams Democrat	1831	22	Jackson	WARD, A	67	90* +
1827	20	Adams Democrat	1829	21	Jackson	WILSON, E	112	59 +
1829	21	Jackson	1831	22	Nullifier	BARNWELL, R	123	84 0
1829	21	Jackson	1837	25	Nullifier	CAMPBELL, J	23	44 0
1829	21	Anti Masonic	1835	24	Anti-Jackson	CHILDS, T	40	38 0
1829	21	Jackson	1833	23	Anti-Jackson	CHILTON, T	67	24 -
1829	21	Jackson	1831	22	Nullifier	DAVIS, W	123	17 0
1829	21	Anti-Jackson	1833	23	Anti Masonic	MARTINDALE	67	48 0
1829	21	Jackson	1831	22	Nullifier	MCDUFFIE, G	123	32 0
1829	21	Jackson	1831	22	Anti-Jackson	STANBERRY	123	81 +
1831	22	Anti-Jackson	1833	23	Anti Masonic	ADAMS, J	104	58 0
1831	22	Jackson	1833	23	Anti-Jackson	BARRINGER	104	25 +
1831	22	Jackson	1833	23	Anti-Jackson	DAVENPORT	104	82 +
1831	22	Jackson	1833	23	Nullifier	FELDER, J	104	35 0
1831	22	Jackson	1833	23	Nullifier	LEWIS, D	104	92 0
1831	22	Anti-Jackson	1833	23	Anti Masonic	PEARCE, D	104	97 0
1831	22	Jackson	1833	23	Anti-Jackson	RENCHER, A	104	52 +
1831	22	Jackson	1841	27	Whig	RUSSELL, W	19	42* +
1831	22	Jackson	1833	23	Anti-Jackson	SHEPPERD, A	104	6 -
1831	22	Anti-Jackson	1833	23	Anti Masonic	WHITTLESEY	104	67 0
1833	23	Jackson	1835	24	Anti-Jackson	BELL, J	140	97 +
1833	23	Jackson	1835	24	Anti-Jackson	BUNCH, S	140	95 +
1833	23	Jackson	1835	24	Anti-Jackson	CLAIBORNE	140	1 -
1833	23	Jackson	1843	28	Whig	DICKINSON	11	91* +
1833	23	Anti Masonic	1837	25	Whig	FILLMORE, M	55	62 0
1833	23	Jackson	1835	24	Anti-Jackson	FORESTER, J	140	98* +
1833	23	Jackson	1841	27	Whig	FOSTER, T	27	19 +
1833	23	Anti Masonic	1835	24	Anti-Jackson	FULLER, P	140	69 0
1833	23	Jackson	1841	27	Whig	GAMBLE, R	27	4 +
1833	23	Anti Masonic	1835	24	Anti-Jackson	HARD, G	140	68 0

1833	23	Anti Masonic	1835	24	Anti-Jackson	HAZELTINE	140	54	0
1833	23	Anti Masonic	1835	24	Anti-Jackson	LAY, G	140	15	0
1833	23	Jackson	1835	24	Anti-Jackson	LEA, L	140	6	+
1833	23	Jackson	1835	24	Anti-Jackson	MCCARTY, J	140	72	+
1833	23	Jackson	1835	24	Anti-Jackson	MCCOMAS, W	140	45	-
1833	23	Jackson	1835	24	Anti-Jackson	PEYTON, B	140	27	+
1833	23	Jackson	1841	27	Whig	RAMSEY, R	27	78*	+
1833	23	Anti-Jackson	1835	24	Anti Masonic	REED, J	140	2	0
1833	23	Jackson	1835	24	Anti-Jackson	STANDIFER	140	99*	+
1833	23	Anti Masonic	1843	28	Whig	STEWART, A	11	27	0
1833	23	Anti Masonic	1835	24	Anti-Jackson	WHITTLESEY	140	28	0
1835	24	Anti Masonic	1837	25	Whig	ADAMS, J	119	15	0
1835	24	Jackson	1837	25	Whig	LAWLER, J	119	54	+
1835	24	Nullifier	1837	25	Democrat	LEWIS, D	119	91	0
1835	24	Anti Masonic	1837	25	Whig	REED, J	119	13	0
1835	24	Anti Masonic	1837	25	Whig	SLADE, W	119	72	0
1835	24	Jackson	1837	25	Whig	WISE, H	119	87	+
1837	25	Democrat	1841	27	Whig	BORDEN, N	68	2	+
1837	25	Nullifier	1839	26	Democrat	CAMPBELL, J	118	83	0
1837	25	Democrat	1839	26	Whig	CLARK, J	118	98*	+
1837	25	Democrat	1839	26	Conservative	GARLAND, J	118	56	0
1837	25	Nullifier	1839	26	Democrat	GRIFFIN, J	118	24	0
1837	25	Democrat	1839	26	Conservative	HOPKINS, G	118	92*	0
1837	25	Anti Masonic	1841	27	Whig	MCKENNAN, T	68	4	0
1837	25	Nullifier	1839	26	Democrat	PICKENS, F	118	45	0
1837	25	Independent	1839	26	Whig	POPE, J	118	69	0
1837	25	Nullifier	1839	26	Democrat	RHETT, R	118	21	0
1837	25	Whig	1839	26	Democrat	SHEPARD, C	118	93*	+
1839	26	Whig	1841	27	Democrat	BLACK, E	126	58	+
1839	26	Democrat	1841	27	Ind. Democrat	CASEY, Z	126	85*	0
1839	26	Whig	1841	27	Democrat	COLQUITT, W	126	91	+
1839	26	Whig	1841	27	Democrat	COOPER, M	126	37	+
1839	26	Anti Masonic	1841	27	Whig	EDWARDS, J	126	21	0
1839	26	Anti Masonic	1841	27	Whig	HENRY, T	126	52	0
1839	26	Conservative	1841	27	Democrat	HOPKINS, G	126	94	0
1839	26	Whig	1841	27	Independent	HUNTER, R	126	99	0
1839	26	Anti Masonic	1841	27	Whig	JAMES, F	126	35	0
1841	27	Whig	1843	28	Democrat	GILMER, T	53	9	-
1841	27	Independent	1845	29	Democrat	HUNTER, R	26	50	0
1841	27	Whig	1843	28	Democrat	WISE, H	53	74	+
1843	28	Law and Order	1845	29	Whig	CRANSTON, H	105	8	0
1843	28	Ind. Democrat	1847	30	Whig	NES, H	56	75	0
1843	28	Ind. Whig	1845	29	Whig	WRIGHT, W	105	22	0
1845	29	Democrat	1847	30	Ind. Democrat	SMITH, R	98	98*	0

Democratic vs. Republican

OLD PARTY

NEW PARTY

Last Yr	Last Cong	Old Party	1st Yr	1st Cong	New Party	Name	N	Pct
1879	46	Ind. Democrat	1881	47	Democrat	TURNER, O	179	82 0
1881	47	Democrat	1883	48	Independent	CHALMERS, J	140	99* 0
1881	47	Democrat	1883	48	Ind. Democrat	TURNER, O	140	34 0
1883	48	Readjuster	1887	50	Republican	BOWEN, H	103	96 0
1883	48	National Greenb	1885	49	Republican	BRUMM, C	183	99 0
1883	48	Readjuster	1885	49	Republican	LIBBEY, H	183	67 0
1883	48	National Greenb	1887	50	Democrat	SHIVELY, B	103	25 0
1885	49	Republican	1887	50	Ind. Republic	ANDERSON, J	192	5 0
1885	49	Ind. Democrat	1887	50	Democrat	MERRIMAN, T	192	49 0
1887	50	Ind. Republican	1889	51	Republican	ANDERSON, J	192	7 0
1887	50	Republican	1897	55	Democrat	BAKER, J	34	97* +
1887	50	Republican	1889	51	Democrat	FITCH, A	192	91 +
1891	52	Republican	1903	58	Democrat	LIND, J	21	95 +
1891	52	Democrat	1893	53	Ind. Democrat	MCALÉER, W	201	31 0
1893	53	Ind. Democrat	1897	55	Democrat	MCALÉER, W	107	22 0
1893	53	Democrat	1909	61	Republican	MORGAN, C	20	95* +
1895	54	Republican	1897	55	Silver Republ	HARTMAN, C	203	99* 0
1895	54	Republican	1897	55	Silver Republ	SHAFROTH, J	203	81 0
1895	54	Republican	1899	56	Silver Republ	WILSON, E	135	93* 0
1895	54	Republican	1905	59	Democrat	TOWNE, C	66	99 +
1897	55	Ind. Republican	1899	56	Republican	BUTLER, T	236	16 0
1899	56	Silver	1901	57	Democrat	NEWLANDS, F	249	29 0
1911	62	Republican	1913	63	Independent	KENT, W	268	98 0
1913	63	Republican	1915	64	Progressive	COPLEY, I	294	35 0
1913	63	Progressive	1919	66	Republican	HULINGS, W	169	62 0
1913	63	Republican	1917	65	Progressive	KELLY, M	237	31 0
1913	63	Republican	1915	64	Progressive	STEPHENS, W	294	89 0
1913	63	Progressive	1915	64	Republican	TEMPLE, H	294	39 0
1913	63	Progressive	1921	67	Republican	WOODRUFF, R	117	54 0
1915	64	Progressive	1917	65	Republican	CHANDLER, W	343	15 0
1915	64	Progressive	1917	65	Republican	COPLEY, I	343	87 0
1915	64	Progressive	1917	65	Republican	ELSTON, J	343	76 0
1917	65	Ind. Republican	1919	66	Republican	FULLER, A	320	66 0
1917	65	Progressive	1919	66	Republican	KELLY, M	320	93 0
1917	65	Republican	1933	73	Farmer-Labor	LUNDEEN, E	59	9 0
1917	65	Progressive	1919	66	Democrat	MARTIN, W	320	86 0
1917	65	Progressive	1919	66	Republican	SCHALL, T	320	81 0
1919	66	Republican	1921	67	Ind. Republic	SHREVE, M	311	77 0
1919	66	Union Labor	1925	69	Farmer-Labor	CARSS, W	203	94 0
1919	66	Ind. Republican	1921	67	Republican	KELLER, O	311	69 0
1921	67	Democrat	1923	68	Republican	CAMPBELL, G	285	93 +
1921	67	Ind. Republican	1923	68	Republican	SHREVE, M	285	9 0
1923	68	Democrat	1927	70	Republican	CLANCY, R	314	100* +
1923	68	Republican	1925	69	American Labo	LA GUARDIA	351	30 0
1925	69	American Labor	1927	70	Republican	LA GUARDIA	367	92 0
1929	71	Republican	1935	74	Progressive	HULL, M	144	94* 0
1931	72	Republican	1935	74	Progressive	AMLIE, T	198	51 0

1931	72	Republican	1935	74	Progressive	SCHNEIDER	198	71	0
1933	73	Republican	1935	74	Progressive	BOILEAU, G	320	87	0
1933	73	Republican	1935	74	Progressive	WITHROW, G	320	81	0
1935	74	Republican	1939	76	American Labo	MARCANTON	247	99*	0
1937	75	Progressive	1939	76	Democrat	HAVENNER, F	309	63	0
1937	75	Progressive	1949	81	Republican	WITHROW, G	97	14	0
1941	77	Republican	1959	86	Democrat	OLIVER, J	67	99*	+
1941	77	Ind. Democrat	1943	78	Democrat	PRIEST, J	322	43	0
1943	78	Farmer-Labor	1945	79	Republican	HAGEN, H	349	92	0
1945	79	Progressive	1947	80	Republican	HULL, M	322	99	0
1949	81	Liberal	1951	82	Democrat	ROOSEVELT	358	74	0
1957	85	Republican	1957	85	Democrat	DELLAY, V	351	100	+
1959	86	Ind. Democrat	1961	87	Democrat	ALFORD, T	369	23	0
1965	89	Democrat	1967	90	Republican	WATSON, A	359	77	-
1971	92	Republican	1973	93	Democrat	REID, O	361	99	+
1973	93	Democrat	1975	94	Republican	JARMAN, J	339	9	-
1973	93	Ind. Democrat	1975	94	Democrat	MOAKLEY, J	339	41	0
1973	93	Republican	1975	94	Democrat	RIEGLE, D	339	99*	+
1975	94	Republican	1979	96	Democrat	PEYSER, P	292	100*	+
1979	96	Democrat	1981	97	Republican	ATKINSON, E	354	89*	+
1981	97	Independent	1983	98	Democrat	FOGLIETTA	351	89	0
1981	97	Democrat	1983	98	Republican	GRAMM, W	351	99	+
1981	97	Democrat	1983	98	Republican	STUMP, B	351	89	+
1983	98	Democrat	1985	99	Republican	IRELAND, A	390	100*	+
1987	100	Democrat	1989	101	Republican	GRANT, B	395	100*	+
1987	100	Democrat	1989	101	Republican	ROBINSON, T	395	100*	+
1989	101	Democrat	1997	105	Republican	WATKINS, W	168	100*	+
1995	104	Democrat	1995	104	Republican	DEAL, N	360	100*	+
1995	104	Democrat	1995	104	Republican	HAYES, J	360	100*	+
1995	104	Democrat	1995	104	Republican	LAUGHLIN, G	360	100*	+
1995	104	Democrat	1995	104	Republican	PARKER, M	360	99*	+
1995	104	Democrat	1995	104	Republican	TAUZIN, W	360	100*	+
1999	106	Republican	1999	106	Democrat	FORBES, M	0		
1999	106	Democrat	1999	106	Independent	GOODE, V	0		

+ Major Party to Major Party Shift, Behavioral Change in Proper Direction

- Major Party to Major Party Shift, Behavioral Change in Wrong Direction

0 Switch to/from Minor Party

Figure 1.





Figure 2



End Notes

¹ Party labels were taken from Martis's (1989) *Historical Atlas of Political Parties in the United States Congress 1789-1989*.

² More precisely, with respect to Martis's (1989) codings, Pro- and Anti-Administration members who would later be classified as Federalists and Jeffersonian Republicans, respectively, were not included. Also excluded are members whose codes changed from Jackson to Democrat, those who changed from Adams to Anti-Jackson, and those who changed from Anti-Jackson to Whig.

³ Keeping with our aim to err on the side of inclusion, members who served as Democrats or Republicans and later labeled themselves Independent Democrat/Republican are coded as party switchers.

⁴ These numbers report the number of party switches, not the number of individuals who switch parties. The number of individuals who changed parties would actually be smaller because some individuals had multiple changes in their party affiliation.

⁵ Treating the roll call parameters as exogenous, the information matrix for each legislator can be used to compute standard errors for the \mathbf{x}_{ikt} . Technically, these are *conditional* standard errors because the roll call parameters are treated as being fixed.

⁶ According to the Biographical Directory of the United States Congress (<http://bioguide.congress.gov/biosearch/biosearch.asp>), the four Representatives broke from the Jacksonian ranks and entered the 24th Congress listed as "White Supporters." Their break was the result of a disagreement with Jackson over the allotment of patronage positions and his anti-banking policies. They ultimately supported the presidential candidacy of Tennessee Senator Hugh Lawson White, also a former Jacksonian, over Jackson's preferred successor, Martin Van Buren, in 1836 (Holt, 1999).

⁷ Detailed discussions of party polarization can be found in Poole and Rosenthal, 1984, 1997, 2001; McCarty, Poole, and Rosenthal, 1997; and King, 1998.